How Did Hungary Turn the Tide Against the Habsburgs in the Winter and Spring of 1849?

In early January 1849, Hungarian military leaders planned strategic troop movements: Perczel moved east to protect the government, while Görgey headed north to divert imperial forces. Despite having only about 16,000 men, Görgey’s Upper Danube corps faced much stronger Austrian troops. 

 To restore morale, Görgey issued the Vác Declaration, criticizing the republican leadership and pledging loyalty only to the Minister of War. This deepened tensions with Kossuth, who then appointed the Polish general Henryk Dembiński as commander-in-chief. Görgey conducted a skillful winter campaign, maneuvering through mountainous terrain to outflank enemy forces.

He joined with Klapka’s troops, while in Transylvania, another Polish commander, Józef Bem, achieved victories against Austrian and Russian troops, pushing them out of the region. Despite these gains, Dembiński’s leadership was poor. He was unfamiliar with the terrain and lost the Battle of Kápolna (February 26–27), which led the Austrian emperor to impose the centralizing Constitution of Olmütz.

In response, Hungarian officers rebelled against Dembiński, and Görgey became the acting commander-in-chief. The Spring Campaign included several Hungarian victories—Hatvan, Tápióbicske, Isaszeg, Vác, and Nagysalló—but failed to encircle the Austrian army, which escaped. Still, these wins led to the dismissal of the Austrian commander Windischgrätz. Görgey’s forces then besieged and captured Buda on May 21, a symbolic and strategic success. Although some hoped for a march on Vienna, the Hungarian forces lacked the strength for such an ambitious goal. Nonetheless, thanks to both northern and southern victories (including Perczel's win over the Serbs), most of Hungary returned to national control by spring 1849.